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During the century 1780-1880 the relationship between the Western world and 
Asia turned increasingly critical. One of the central factors in that collision of 
civilizations was the transfer of science and technology to and/or into Asia. 
Another was the maritime revolution which played a pivotal role in the creation 
of the Western-dominated world economic system and the expansion of Western 
power and influence into Asia as Western ships were the indispensable and 
indisputable 'instruments' of transport, commerce and empire.1 As the world's 
shipping industry went through a process of revolutionary technological change, 
which was more profound than that of any previous period, these two factors are 
firmly' intertwined. Major stages of this maritime revolution were dramatic 
improvements in the wooden sailing ship, the use of metal as a ship-building 
material and, above all, the introduction and diffusion of the steamship which, 
itself, was continuously being further developed in size, power and productivity? 
     It is not surprising that the Western powers often nurtured and fostered 
their maritime superiority and actively resisted or hindered the transfer of the 
technology underpinning that superiority. Indeed, as the editor of the proceedings 
of the first 'Transfer' conference suggested,3 one often has to analyse the 'why-
not' question as much as the 'why' question. But, even accepting that for many 
varied reasons traditiQnal maritime technology could and did survive in Asian 
waters, in this period of maturing imperialism the inhibiting factors in the transfer 
of modern shipping and shipbuilding to Asia, at least in the colonised parts of the 
continent, appear to have been less rooted in the refusal of Asian society to seek
1 D. R. Headrick The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century 
  (New York 1981) Chs. 9 and 12. 
2 A modern international history of shipping in this period still remains to be written, but see, 
  e.g., the classic A. W. Kirkaldy British Shipping (London 1919). 
3 W. G. J. Remmelink 'From the Editor', Journal of the Japan-Netherlands Institute III (Tokyo 1991) 6.
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the transfer of technology than in the refusal of Westerners to provide assistance 
in that process. 
     The article is thus built up around three themes. The first concerns the first 
sixty years or so of the period and is virtually exclusively concerned with the 
colonial areas of the various European empires. The second discusses the 
divergent path taken in the later part by China and Japan by sharp contrast with 
events in those areas of Asia where the West could wield power. The third major 
issue, finally, is the comparison between the maritime development of what in 
historical orthodoxy are seen as the 'winner' and 'loser' in the East Asian 
powerplay, viz. Japan and China. Because of the cut-off point in 1880, however, 
there is less contrast in the relative maritime performance of these players than 
most observers might expect. Although it might be too provocative a question to 
direct at the overall political efficacy and economic modernisation of both 
countries, in the maritime sphere one must wonder whether the issue had been 
decided already so early and so conclusively. 
     By way of introduction, it must be stressed that the transfer process could 
be complex and not necessarily linear as Asia, by contrast to the Western world, 
could not rely on the full scientific, economic and political resources which were 
required for a smooth transition from one stage of maritime transport technology 
to another. Thus the process of interaction between Western technology and Asian 
societies was often hesitant and fluctuating. Moreover, many kinds of interaction 
existed such as the permanent introduction of Western ships to Asian waters; the 
transfer of control and/or ownership of such vessels from Western to Asian 
businessmen or governments; direct access by Asians to Western sources of such 
vessels instead of relying on the local purchasing of, inevitably, second-hand and 
often lower-quality ships; the repairing and/or building of such Western ships in 
Asian shipyards; giving Asians access to the relevant Western technology and/or 
scientific knowledge through training and/or education in Western yards or 
institutions; and, finally, the establishment of such training and/or educational 
institutions in Asian countries. While artisinal skills, for example, were largely 
sufficient for the transfer of wooden ship-building, the development of the sea-
going steamship relied increasingly on scientific research and development .4 The 
following, inevitably highly succinct, overview will attempt to sketch the process 
of transfer of modern maritime transport technology to Asia. According to the 
two major types of Western maritime technology, first the sailing-ship and then 
the steamer will be discussed. At several instances it will be important to consider 
the naval dimensions of technology transfer as well.
4 See, e.g., John Guthrie A History of Marine Engineering (London 1971).
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     But first several general observations should be made. First, maritime 
Europe knew an almost limitless variety of sailing craft, many of which never 
emerged from relatively narrowly defined geographical niches. Only a small 
number of classes, naturally almost exclusively the larger, sturdier and sea-
worthier categories, ever ventured beyond the Capes to Asian destinations. These 
were, above an ,5 large three-masters (at first square-rigged on all masts but later 
also barques) and to a lesser extent smaller two-masted brigs and schooners which 
sailed to and in Asian waters. In consequence, it was these types which were 
available as models for imitation by Asian based shipwrights and for purchase by 
Asian owners. 
     Asia, it cannot be stressed enough, had at least equally strong maritime 
traditions as its European invaders. From Arabia to Japan innumerable towns, 
villages and bays were the scene of boats and ships being built by thousands, if 
not tens of thousands, of shipwrights and carpenters. Even if their products 
generally could not match the best Western vessels in sturdiness, capacity and 
performance, Asian ships were as varied and as ingenious in design and 
construction. From the viewpoint of this paper the crucial condition was that in 
both cultural regions the building of wooden ships was an artisinal form of 
production in which the fundamental professional requirements were still largely 
comparable. Initially, political domination by the West, be it Britain, the 
Netherlands or Spain, gave considerable stimulus to such transfer of technology 
before colonialist policies snuffed out the industries thus fostered. 
     But from the late eighteenth century the Western ocean-going sailing-ship 
went through a significant process of development, tonnage growth and 
productivity increase which ultimately resulted in the clipper and the sailing 
tramps of a century later. Much of this process was caused by changes in design, 
much also by the adoption of new materials. In particular copper, for sheathing 
and fastening, and iron, for rigging, found widespread adoption. While there were 
ample resources of suitable shipbuilding timber in South and Southeast Asia, 
other materials often had to be imported at high expense from Western sources. 
More importantly, with the diffusion of non-timber-based technology, which 
required altogether different skills, there arose real questions whether under these 
conditions Asian shipbuilding by imitation could be sustained. 
     These issues became decisive when metal was used for the frames, hulls 
and masts of ever larger sailing-ships. Such technology could only be sustained
5 See J. R. Bruijn et al. Dutch-Asiatic Shipping in the 17th and 18th Centuries I (The Hague 1987) 39-
  41, 50-51 and 55; Ingrid D. Dillo De nadagen van de Verenigde OostindischeCompagnie 1783-1795 
   Schepen en zeevarenden (Amsterdam 1992) 53-54 and 72-73, on other types such as fluyten 
   and hoekers chartered and bought by the VOC during its last years.
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by shipyards with highly skilled labour forces and possessing all appropriate tools 
and sources of supply. It is difficult to see how such yards could exist at centres 
other than those located at or near modern metallurgical industries and that 
meant the West. The same applied with even greater force to steamships once the 
initial stage of fitting imported engines into ready-built wooden hulls was 
abandoned. Although several dedicated repair yards were established in a 
number of mostly colonial Asian ports, it was not until the independent 
governments of China and Japan, following the example of many European 
nations in a concerted strategy of developing modern navies, embarked on-
primarily naval-shipbuilding policies that an indigenous Asian steamship and 
engine-building industry could emerge. Ironically, again, the pressure of the times 
was such that, after a promising start, both East Asian countries switched over to 
policies of buying abroad, thus creating another series of sharp discontinuities. 
     But for the development of modern Asian merchant shipping the existence 
of local shipbuilding, however important that could be, was not an absolute 
prerequisite. At various times and places, active second-hand markets existed for 
sailing-ships and later also steamers where Asian businessmen could purchase 
tonnage on the spot. Even if this, well-nigh inevitably, pushed such owners of 
less-than-new tonnage into the lower echelons of the freight market, it gave them 
a toehold into what otherwise would have been a totally Western preserve. That 
sufficient capital was available for their entry into the steam shipping market is 
shown by a number of ambitious and determined companies which ordered new 
tonnage directly from British shipyards.
    The first stage of the transfer of Western maritime technology to Asia 
involved the wooden sailing-ship. Its diffusion was remarkably widespread, both 
in the shipbuilding and shipping industries, even if neo-mercantilistic policies of 
Britain and the Netherlands proved highly detrimental to the former. But the rise 
of Asian shipyards ultimately proved to be a hollow victory as no economic and 
educational systems existed to enable local builders to continue to keep pace with 
overseas builders and, later, to make the transition to the construction of metal 
hulls and marine engines. Asian shipowners, of course, could and did continue 
the practice of buying second-hand material from overseas, but their demand was 
no longer a stimulus for on-the-spot new construction. 
    The most widespread and spectacular diffusion of Western shipbuilding in 
our period could be found in India, but the first such ships were built much earlier
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for the Spanish.6 The demand for galleons in the transpacific trade between 
Acapulco and Manila was met by a multitude of builders and carpenters, mostly 
but by no means exclusively Chinese. Probably the greater part of these large 
vessels was built at Manila and on Luzon, but orders for others were placed 
elsewhere in the Philippines and, until 1679, even in Siam and Japan. It is not 
clear whether the leading shipwrights were Spanish and Chinese, but a diffusion 
of building technique from the royal dockyards to private enterprise is certain to 
have taken place. This construction took place during the whole of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The example set in the Philippines was 
eagerly followed elsewhere in Asia once private enterprise emancipated itself 
from the restrictions imposed by the various East India Companies. 
     The British capture of Manila, in 1762, may not have had any direct impact 
but it was symbolic for the shift to the eastern seas which came to characterise the 
interests of the country traders, the private shipowners and merchants operating 
under licence from the East India Company .7 With a strong acceleration after 1784 
a new complexion came over Indian seaborne commerce which created a strong 
demand for Western-type vessels. Southeast Asia (Penang was founded in 1786), 
the Philippines, Canton and Australia became regular destinations for private 
ships from Bengal, Bombay and other Indian ports. With only very few ships 
being imported from Europe for their use, expatriate British and indigenous 
Indian shipowners (at this stage occasionally linked in close partnerships such as 
Carr Tagore & Co)8 could not but rely on locally built tonnage. 
     Between the 1780's and the 1830's hundreds of Western-type sailing-ships 
were produced on shipyards all along the Indian littoral. Benefiting from ample 
supplies of superior hardwoods, especially teak, the best of these easily compared 
with the highest-quality European ships. Several of the largest and best-known 
Eastindiamen of the day originated from Bombay which became the premier 
shipbuilding centre of India. The yard of the Parsee Wadias has almost become 
legendary.9 Even the Royal Navy had warships built there, including the Asia, 
Codrington's flagship at the battle of Navarino. But many other places shared in 
the work. These included Calcutta with several satellite settlements on the 
Hooghly and a large number of smaller traditional port towns such as Chittagong,
6 This paragraph is based on W. L. Schurz The Manila Galleon (New York 1959) 193-200. 
7 P. J. Marshall 'Private British Trade in the Indian Ocean Before 1800', in Ashin Das Gupta & M. 
  N. Pearson, eds. India and The Indian Ocean 1500-1800 (Calcutta 1987) 290-300. 
8 B. Kling Partner in Empire: Dwarkanath Tagore and the Age of Enterprise in Eastern India (Berkeley 
  1976) Ch. 4. 
9 R.A.Wadia The Bombay Dockyard and the Wadia Master Builders (Bombay 1955).
121
F. Broeze
Coringa (near Kakinada) and Cochin.10 Surprisingly early, too, European-type 
ships were constructed in Burma, at Rangoon and Moulmein, the main source of 
building timber for Bengal. Especially the latter port became known for the 
passenger ships the London shipowner Duncan Dunbar built there as late as the 
1850's on his own yard.11 But this was the swansong of the Asian industry. 
    Although their initial field of employment had been the country trade in 
Asian waters, India-built ships very quickly gained a footing in the 
intercontinental trade with Britain. As I have explained elsewhere,12 
circumstances during the French Wars made it occasionally necessary for the East 
India Company to charter such tonnage. Once the East India Act of 1813 had 
thrown open the Indian trade to private shipping a direct confrontation between 
British built and local tonnage ensued. While the sale of Indian built ships to 
British shipowners could not be prohibited,13 the exclusion of Indian seamen (the 
so-called 'lascars') from the Navigation Acts meant that in practice Indian-owned 
ships were excluded from trading outside Asian waters. In this manner 
metropolitan interests were able to smother the potential competition from Indian 
shipyards. When the Navigation Acts were abolished, in 1850, commercial 
conditions and shipping technology had already changed so much that no come-
back was possible. 
     The spectacular rise of Western-type wooden shipbuilding in India gave 
unprecedented stimulus to modern shipowning. Significantly, owners included 
both British agency houses and indigenous entrepreneurs. The latter often 
operated mixed fleets of native-style and Western vessels. The rise of 
entrepreneurs like Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy and others in the Bombay-Canton 
opium trade was entirely based on their ownership of considerable numbers of 
the latter 14 Indian shipyards also exported large numbers of Western vessels to 
other Asian regions. Probably the best-known of these were the ships ordered by 
Sultan Seyyid Said of Oman (only one of his vessels was built at Mattrah). Several 
of his mixed naval-commercial fleet ventured outside the Indian Ocean 15 But by
10 W. Milburn Oriental Commerce II (London 1813) 174; see, above all, the lists of ships built in 
  India in J. Phipps A Guide to the Commerce of Bengal (Calcutta 1823) and Idem., A Collection of 
  Papers Relative to Shipbuilding in India (Calcutta 1840). See also Charles Bateson The Convict 
  Ships 1787-1868 (2nd ed., Glasgow 1%9) appendix 1-6, passim. 
11 B. Lubbock The Blackwall Frigates (Glasgow 1928) 245-247. 
12 Frank Broeze 'Underdevelopment and Dependency: Maritime India during the Raj', Modern 
  Asian Studies 18 (1984) 434-435. 
13 Except for the period 1815-1823. 
14 Asiya Siddiqi 'The Business World of Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy', Indian Economic & Social History 
  Review 19 (1982) 319-324. 
15 Oman Ministry of Information & Culture Oman, A Seafaring Nation (Muscat 1979) 74-86; see 
  also Patricia Russo Oman & Muscat: An Early Modern History (London 1986)101.
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far the greater part of such. Indian built tonnage was sold second-hand. Ready 
markets came to exist in Penang, the Dutch East Indies and, since 1819, Singapore. 
Although local shipbuilding industries sprung up in many places, they were 
never able to satisfy the demand for Western-style vessels once conditions of more 
or less free trade applied. 
    This was particularly evident in the Dutch East Indies after the abolition 
(1799) of the Dutch East India Company (VOC). Although the company itself had 
been heavily involved in the infra-Asian trade, it had never allowed its Javanese 
djati forests to be used for the building of anything larger than lighters or very 
small craft.16 Moreover, its restrictions on private shipowning delayed the 
development of both maritime industries until well after Indian shipbuilding had 
come on stream. But the extent of modern shipowning in 1820, the first year for 
which detailed data are available, strongly suggests that from the turn of the 
century a powerful take-off took place, in which all ethnic groups participated. 
On Java and Madura 10,844 last (c. 20,000 tons) of Western-type sailing-craft, were 
registered. Of these 25.5% belonged to Dutch individuals and merchant firms, 
against 22.6% British, 21.8% Arab, 16.7% Chinese and 7.3% indigenous (Javanese, 
Sundanese and Madurese) ownership 17 
     Elsewhere I have attempted to analyse and assess the growth of the 
Javanese merchant fleet until 1850.18 Here it is sufficient to note that, after a peak 
in the mid 1840's, its total tonnage then rested at 15,503 last (c. 29,000 tons), a 
figure which was only marginally higher than that of 1825. The ethnic 
composition of the collective ownership, however, had dramatically changed. 
Now no less than 50.7% belonged to Arabs and 28.7% to Chinese (both peak 
figures), against only 9.6% to Dutch, 9.3% to British and 3.1% to indigenous 
owners. Evidently, just as non-British entrepreneurs in India had both the 
resources and the desire to enter the Western or high-quality part of the shipping 
market, so did many non-European owners on Java and in other commercial 
centres of the Dutch East Indies such as Palembang, Pontianak and 
Bandjermassin. In direct competition with European rivals their lower operational 
cost levels and their involvement in local and regional trade gave them powerful 
advantages. In particular the Arabs, largely originating from the Hadhramaut, 
eagerly adopted relatively large Western three-masters and barques for the bulk
16 Dillo Nadagen VOC 80. 
17 The figures in this and following paragraph are based on the annual Regeringsalmanak 
  published by the colonial government in Batavia. 
18 Frank Broeze 'The Merchant Fleet of Java, 1820-1850', Archipel 18 (1979) 251-269.
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transport of goods such as rice and passengers like soldiers within the archipelago 
or hajis on the long haul to Jiddah.19 
     The ships for this vibrant new merchant fleet were built in India and on 
Java itself.20 The capture of Batavia by the British, in 1811, brought the Dutch East 
Indies within the commercial sphere of India and during the next decade a large 
number of Indian ships were sold to Eastern owners 21 But at the same time the 
local shipbuilding industry, now free from all shackles, came on stream. 
Particularly on the northeast coast of Java, at places such as Rembang, Gresik and 
Surabaya, new yards were established or established yards switched over to the 
construction of Western three-masters, brigs and schooners. By the mid 1820's a 
large number of such vessels had been built, mainly in the 80-200 tons range but 
also several of over 300 tons. These included the Hunter which, in 1822, was re-
registered in the Netherlands and at least three others which carried cargoes to the 
Netherlands on account of their colonial (but ethnically European) owners.22 But 
Arab owners also did not hesitate to order large ships culminating in the huge Fait 
Allam (560 last, c. 1,050 tons).23 But, similar to what happened in British India, 
after a few years of complete freedom the competition of Java's shipbuilders and 
shipowners was thwarted by measures taken by the Netherlands government. 
     First, in 1819, registration of ships under the metropolitan Dutch flag was 
only allowed to ships built in the Netherlands, excepting extraordinary 
circumstances 24 Two years later a subsidy system was introduced for such ships 
and in 1824, finally, the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij was established 
with the avowed aim of employing only nationally-built vessels at initially 
exceptionally high freight rates 25 The possibility that ships owned in the Indies, 
by Dutch or British merchant houses, could continue to operate in the trade 
between the East Indies and the Netherlands was negated by the interpretation
19 By contrast, Western-type vessels of Chinese and indigenous owners were significantly smaller 
   and consisted, mainly of schooners (T. S. Raffles The History of Java I [London 1817] 203, and, 
   esp., Regeringsalmanak [1820-1870] passim). 
20 There is no evidence of any Netherlands-built ship having been sold to Asian owners during 
  this period. 
21 See the shipping lists in Phipps Commerce of Bengal and Shipbuilding in India. 
22 Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague [henceforth ARA], Staatssecretarie [henceforth SS] 2286 (4 
  August 1825) N 103, and 2364 (24 November 1825) N 78; Kolonien 2813 (6 May 1828); and 
   Collectie Baud 234, memorandum by J. Wappers Melis (10 August 1822). 
23 Regeringsalmanak (1831); see also G. W. Earl The Eastern Seas (London 1837) 71-72. 
24 F. J. W. H. Sandbergen Nederlandsche en nederlandsch-indische scheeps-nationaliteit (Leiden 1931) 
   Ch. 2, pt. IV, and Ch. 3. J. A. Kok De scheepvaart-bescherming in Nederlanden Nederlandsch-Indie 
  (Leiden 1931) 4-9. 
25 W. M. F. Mansvelt De Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij 1824-1924 I (Haarlem 1924) 97-98; Kok, 
   Scheepvaartbescherming, 16-25; Frank Broeze De Stad Schiedam. De nederlandse vaart op Oost-
  Indie omstreeks 1840 (Leiden 1978) 5-12.
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which the government gave to its 1822 discriminatory tariff act. After several 
vessels registered at Batavia had landed their cargoes under conditions equal to 
those applying to metropolitan ships, it was decreed that such ships, as far as the 
discriminatory tariff was concerned, would be regarded as foreign 26 Here it was 
ships' flags, in Britain it was the nationality of seamen. But the purpose of each 
government was only too clear: where the transfer of shipbuilding technology and 
Western-style shipping from Europe to Asia was obviously successful and 
threatened to endanger metropolitan interests, political measures were adopted to 
counter such threats. 
     The final chapter of this struggle was written in the 1830's after a Java-built 
three-master, using the loophole of the 1819 registration act of 'extraordinary 
circumstances', had been sold to a prominent Amsterdam shipowner. The 
government in Batavia and the Ministry of Colonial Affairs now proposed that it 
would be to the advantage of the, at that time, stagnating colonial shipbuilding 
industry if such sales would be made possible as a matter of routine.27 Caught in 
the logical paradox of advocating the benefits of such a move for Java and at the 
same time suggesting that such a move would have no effect on the Dutch 
industry, the colonial lobby was easily sideswiped by the combined forces of the 
Chambers of Commerce of Amsterdam and Rotterdam and the various other 
ministries. Even if the evidence allowed discussion on the point of the relative 
competitiveness of the Java-built ships, there was no counter to the Dutch 
colonialist ideology of the time: "... the interests of a colony should not be 
considered in isolation but in relation to those of the mother country and, should 
there be a collision of interests, as subordinated to those."28 
     From all the foregoing it is evident that no significant barriers existed in the 
transfer of building and owning of Western-style wooden sailing ships to Asia. In 
particular Indian built ships were competitive in price and quality. But in the 
Dutch as much as in the British empire no such enterprise was allowed to 
challenge metropolitan interests and soon colonial shipyards were effectively 
restricted to selling in local markets. European expatriates and, more importantly, 
Asian shipowners were keen to enter a great variety of trade in Asian seas where 
they were clearly able to undercut European rivals 29 This remained so also after
26 ARA, SS 2286 (4 August 1825) N 103, and 2364 (24 November 1825) N 78. 
27 This paragraph is based on the file in ARA, SS 4307, (9 November 1837) N 83. 
28 Chamber of Commerce Amsterdam to Administrateur National Nijverheid (26 October 1835) 
   in ibid. Through a bureaucratic oversight Dutch East Indies vessels for a few years were 
   allowed to trade with the British colonies in Australia. One of the ships which was employed 
   in that trade was the "superior" Justin, "built upon the improved principle laid down by Sir 
   William Symonds, of no hollow lines." (Sydney Herald 17 May 1838). 
29 See, e.g., Raffles History of Java I, 200-201 and 228-229.
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Asian shipbuilders could not produce any more vessels comparable with those 
built in Europe or the United States. As the statistics for the Dutch East Indies 
after 1850 show, local shipowners remained a force for another thirty years or so.30 
Qualitative and quantitative evidence for Singapore suggests a very comparable 
situation, with only a reverse balance of power between Arabs and Chinese 31 In 
1866,178 Western-style square-riggers were homeported at Singapore, of which 58 
belonged to European, Malay and Indian owners against no less than 120 to 
Chinese 32 As yet no analysis has been made of Indian shipowning during the 
second half of the nineteenth century, but from incidental evidence it is clear that 
also Indian owners continued to buy such second-hand, but now overseas-built, 
tonnage until the commercial life of the sailing-ship was coming to an end. Very 
much the same was the case in Japan once all restrictions on shipowning were 
abolished.33 As before, however, such Asian-owned vessels rarely ventured 
outside the Indian Ocean and East Asian seas. Thus a clipper like the Sir Launcelot 
could spend its last years on the India-Mauritius run.34 
    By that stage the sailing-ship for long-distance trading was either 
composite or, more commonly, metal-built. No such vessels, which could measure 
well over 1,000 tons, were ever built in Asian shipyards. It was, in fact, the 
transition from wood to metal which locked traditional shipbuilders out of the 
new industry as artisinal methods were incapable of working with the new 
material. No colonial government ever supported such a direct technological 
transition or provided support for the preconditions necessary for the emergence 
of iron or steel building, including the establishment or promotion of a local 
metallurgical industry and suitable education and training for a skilled workforce. 
But, in principle, such vessels could be bought by Asian shipowners as the capital 
for such investments was available. They did not use that opportunity, probably 
partly because local yards were incapable of maintaining them and partly because 
Asian shipowners simply did not conceive of the intercontinental trades as 
employment for their fleets. To a certain extent, their failure to transfer into metal 
steam shipping was a voluntary retreat which resembled that of the pre-1780 
period, but it was also conditioned by the absence of a modern ship building
30 Regeringsalmanak, passim, and the lists in H. Sweys' annual compilation, De Nederlandsche 
   vloot en rederijen, passim. 
31 Singapore, Surabaya and Hong Kong were common places for the sale of used Australian 
   sailing ships; see the colonial shipping registers in Public Record Office, Kew (London), Board 
   of Trade 107, and also a variety of letters written by the Sydney merchants-shipowner Robert 
   Towns in Mitchell Library (Sydney), Uncat. Mss. 307, items 69-71. 
32 Song Ong Siang One Hundred Years of the Chinese in Singapore (London 1923) 119. 
33 See, e.g., Marius B. Jansen Sakamoto Ryoma and the Meiji Restoration (Princeton 1961) 183, and R. 
  Furuta & Y. Hirai A Short History of Japanese Merchant Shipping (Tokyo 1967) 110. 
34 Arthur H. Clark The Clipper Ship Era 1843-1869 (New York 1910) 346.
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industry. This, in turn, was largely conditioned by political factors as was equally 
shown in the, far less voluntary, small presence of Asian shipowners in steam 
shipping which by 1880 had already established itself firmly on Asia's local, 
regional and intercontinental trade routes.
* * *
     The historical development and diffusion of river and sea-going steam 
navigation in Asian waters has been chronicled in great detail and little needs to 
be added to that historiography here. Three elements, however, must be 
highlighted: the vast support given by imperial and colonial governments to 
Western enterprise and, similarly, by Chinese and Japanese authorities to their 
nascent industries; the size and market share of Asian merchant shipping and the 
external conditions which helped to determine that participation; and the 
miniscule shipbuilding industry which existed in Asia by 1880 (and which was 
largely naval rather than commercial in purpose and character). 
     The beginnings of steam navigation in Asia, as almost everywhere in 
Europe outside Britain lay with merchants who desired a vehicle of quick 
despatch for valuable merchandise, passengers and mail 35 While the former two 
were purely subjects of commercial enterprise, government carried responsibility 
for the latter. After an initial period in which colonial authorities themselves ran 
steamers in a more or less desultory fashion 36 a symbiosis of government and 
business was achieved through the adoption of mail contracts which provided 
state subsidies for private steam shipping companies. This system of mail 
subsidies had been introduced by the British government in the late 1830's for 
lines connecting English ports with the Iberian peninsula, the West Indies and 
British North America 37 In 1840 there followed a contract with the Peninsular & 
Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P & 0) for a two-stage service from Britain
35 Compare, for example, the beginnings of steam shipping between Batavia and Surabaya in the 
   1820's (Encyclopaedia van Nederlandsch Indie IV [19181 'Stoomvaart', 111-112), with those of the 
   almost simultaneously opened steam run between Venice and Trieste. 
36 This applied, above all, to the EIC for the Bombay-Suez run and the Dutch East Indies 
   government which operated a steamer between Batavia and Singapore. 
37 Amongst the rapidly growing literature see the excellent overview in Freda Harcourt, 'British 
   oceanic mail contracts in the age of steam, 1838-1914', Journal of Transport History 3rd ser., 9 
   (1988) 1-18 (and the references cited there); more specifically on the P & 0, her 'The P & 0 
   Company: Flagships of Imperialism', in S. Palmer & G. Williams, eds. Charted and Uncharted 
   Waters (London 1982) 6-28; and on the BISN, Broeze 'Imperialism and Dependency', 441-446, 
   and J. Forbes Munro 'The "Scrubby Scotch Screw Company": British India Steam Navigation 
   Co.'s Coastal Services in South Asia, 1862-1870', in L. R. Fischer, ed. From Wheel House to 
   Counting House: Essays in Maritime Business History (St. John's, Newfoundland 1992) 43-72.
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to India via Egypt which was presently extended by a service from Bombay via 
Singapore to China. 
     Shipping, trade and passenger traffic in Asian waters was revolutionised by 
this development, even more so when the Bengal & Burmah Steam Navigation 
Company (in 1862 renamed the British India Steam Navigation Company (BISN]) 
from 1856 opened a network of subsidised services around the Indian coast as 
well as eastward and westward into Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf. The 
government of the Dutch East Indies, in 1850, accepted the proposition of W. 
Cores de Vries and began its own rapidly growing network of subsidised lines in 
the archipelago. In 1867 the BISN gained the contract for an even larger network 
in the Dutch East Indies which, because of the local protectionist shipping 
registration act, it operated through a Dutch subsidiary. In 1864 the French 
Messageries Imperiales, imitating and challenging the British, gained a contract 
for the French trunk route from Marseilles to Saigon via Egypt. After the opening 
of the Suez Canal in 1869, finally, a number of steam shipping companies emerged 
in the Netherlands which also enjoyed government support on their direct service 
to the East Indies 38 These Western shipping lines, in their turn, stimulated the 
growth of a number of repair docks and other facilities, to which later more 
reference will be made. 
     It would, at this stage and under these circumstances, be unrealistic to 
assume that Asian shipowners could gain entry into the new intercontinental 
trades as they for a short while had enjoyed under sail. But in the intra-Asian 
trades enough traffic was being generated for a transition from sail to steam, as 
the growth of the BISN and Cores de Vries and also the growth of Western steam 
shipping on the Chinese coast indicated. A bird's eye view around Asia shows 
that Asian businessmen indeed did not hesitate to enter the field and thus transfer 
steam technology in shipping to their control. In due course, but outside our 
period, their achievement was to be challenged head-on by Western, and then also 
Japanese, interests whose greater resources ensured that much of this early Asian 
mastery over steam shipping and steam shipping technology, in very similar 
fashion as to what had happened in the wooden sailing-ship industry, was 
transitory. Around 1880, however, one could have believed that their position 
was secure, albeit modest, and in some areas even promising. 
    The first local steam shipping company in India was established at Bombay 
in 1845. Reflecting the still existing and perhaps even promising close relations 
between British and indigenous enterprise, the Bombay Steam Navigation
38 Kok, Scheepvaartbescherming, 101-112.
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Company was a joint venture of British and Indian capital.39 It operated ferry and 
coastal services and soon provided indispensable in linking Bombay with its 
maritime hinterland ranging from Gujarat in the north to Kerala in the south. In 
1869 the company was reorganised and the proportion of its Indian ownership 
further increased. Between 1898 and its takeover by British interests in 1906, the 
Bombay Steam Navigation Company was even fully Indian-owned. It survived so 
long where many other companies failed. From the late 1850's to c. 1870 almost 
twenty steam shipping ventures were launched in Bombay and Bengal. All failed, 
due to insufficient demand, faulty management and the sharp rivalry of the 
established British companies, above all BISN. The only other company extant in 
1880 was the Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Company recently (1877) 
founded by a group of Muslim businessmen for the hajj traffic between India and 
Jiddah. Clearly, then, local enterprise could exist in the niches left unoccupied by 
Western companies; any venture into well-established trade routes, for example 
between Bombay or Calcutta and China, had been quickly pushed aside. 
     In the Dutch East Indies, similar to the situation on India's west coast, there 
were still market gaps between the ever denser fabric of Western steamship 
services. While these, for bulk cargoes, helped local sailing-ship owners to survive, 
they also stimulated non-Western businessmen to venture into steam. In 1875 their 
vessels were still "of small tonnage and found employment exclusively in 
tramping or on roadsteads".40 But in the later years of the decade and the 1880's 
they also ventured out into longer-distance routes. The East Indies shipping 
registers show that especially Chinese made their presence felt while Arabs, after 
a number of incidental ventures 41 fell away quickly. This pattern corresponds 
closely with that of Singapore and raises the question as to the causes of this 
ethnic differentiation which was just the reverse of the participation of each group 
in the European sailing-ship industry. It is suggestive to conclude that the Arabs 
constituted a closely-knit maritime community whose accomplishments were 
intimately tied to their mastery over the technology of timber, while Chinese 
businessmen already by that stage specifically and consciously followed the 
European technology. Probably more importantly, Chinese owners were able to 
tie in their operations with extensive Chinese commercial networks while Arabs, 
whose vessels had largely been freight carriers on account of others, had no such 
support.
39 T. S. Sanjeeva Rao A Short History of Modern Indian Shipping (Bombay 1965) 59-67. 
40 J. N. F. M. A Campo Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij. Stoomvaart en staats-vorming in de 
  Indonesische archipel 1888-1914 (Hilversum 1992) 53. 
41 These may have included a short-lived venture in the hajj trade with Jiddah (Encyclopaedie van 
   Nederlandsch-Indie, IV, 116).
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     In the British and Dutch colonies there never was any thought about using 
the mail subsidies to encourage local, non-Western, shipping enterprise. 
Paradoxically and rather perversely, classical liberal laissez-faire ideologies were 
used to justify the destruction of local shipowners in their rivalry with established 
Western companies. With regard to the relationship between Western and Chinese 
steam shipping in Southeast Asia, to a certain extent the same observation can be 
made as that made with regard to Indian shipowners: without political support 
indigenous shipowners were restricted to niches left open by their more powerful 
rivals 42 But especially Singapore offered many more such opportunities than 
India and from the 1870's a variety of Chinese entrepreneurs jostled for positions 
in the many short-distance routes. These linked Singapore with its complex 
maritime hinterland which often also included ports in the Dutch East Indies. 
Thus, by 1879 already eight Chinese steamship owners were registered in 
Singapore, including Bun Hin & Company who in the 1880's operated services to 
Malaya and China and had agencies at Hong Kong, Swatow, Amoy and Penang 43 
At Hong Kong, Kwok A Cheong played very much a similar role as the first 
Chinese to own steamships and by adopting Western business methods built up a 
commercial fortune 44 In a number of these regional trades these overseas Chinese 
could flourish until the outbreak of the Great War but in due course also they 
came under increasing pressure and the steamship was largely 're-transferred' to 
Western control.45 
     The diffusion of steam navigation led to a considerable diffusion of repair 
facilities in Asian waters as steamers could not easily be repatriated for repairs or 
maintenance. These enterprises, in themselves, provide useful examples to 
consider the question whether and how much such Western industrial and 
technological development gave impetus to modernization in their port cities and 
hinterlands. Both British front runners, the P & 0 and BISN, set up their own 
establishments at Bombay and Calcutta, respectively, and the former also in 
several other major ports of call, including Singapore. At Whampoa they took 
over the existing mud dock and put it under supervision of the Scot John Couper; 
the simple reason for this change was 'the coming of the iron ship'.46 Eighteen 
years later, in 1863, out of this modest enterprise arose the independent Hong 
Kong & Whampoa Dock Company. By 1870 this company controlled all docks
42 J. N. F. M. A Campo KPM 53-54. 
43 Song Chinese in Singapore 200-1 and 209, and J. N. F. M. A Campo 'De chinese stoomvaart in de 
  Indische Archipel', Jambatan 2 (1983/84) 2-12. 
44 Austin Coates Whampoa: Ships on the Shore (Hong Kong 1980) 87. 
45 K. G. Tregonning Home Port Singapore: A History of Straits Steamships Company Limited 1895-
  1965 (Singapore 1967) Ch. 1. 
46 Coates Whampoa 12.
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and repair facilities at Hong Kong.47 During the 1870's Hong Kong & Whampoa 
began the construction of river boats, lighters and launches; later sea-going 
steamers were added to its program 48 Between 1875 and 1897 the Chinese work 
force of the yard fluctuated between 4,700 and 7,000 men which made it one of the 
largest, if not the largest, such expatriate enterprise. Indeed, the enterprise was a 
remarkable example of industrialisation in Asia but its management and 
engineering leadership remained firmly in British hands. It is difficult to discern 
any technological influence of the yard on China and the same applies to Swire & 
Butterfield's yard of river craft in Shanghai. Rather than being a pioneering 
bridgehead, Hong Kong & Whampoa despite its large work force remained a 
Western island in which there was a clear racial hierarchy-and separation-of 
labour, technology and, above all, power. Very much the same judgement must 
apply to the Tanjong Pagar Dock Company at Singapore (1879 some 2,500 
employees),49 and smaller establishments such as Walker & Son at Colombo or 
those of Cores de Vries and later the NISM at Batavia.50
     The situation and structure of merchant shipping under colonial control 
stood in stark contrast with the situation in China proper and Japan after their 
enforced 'opening' by the West in mid-century.51 There, government could and 
did intervene in the development of industrial and transport technology. Often 
such intervention was inspired by political motives and partly if not wholly 
directed toward the building up of military and naval resources. Considerable 
differences existed between the political and economic situations of China and 
Japan and, in consequence, also in their maritime policies and achievements. But, 
naturally, both were aimed at gaining a foothold in coastal and regional trade 






Ibid., pt. 3. 
Ibid., pt. 7. 
C. M. Turnbull A History of Singapore 1819-1975 (Singapore 1985) 95. The P & 0 establishment 
was later amalgamated with Tanjong Pagar. 
J. N. F. M. A Campo KPM 422. 
And, in principle also Persia and the various independent shaykhdoms around the Arabian 
peninsula. In the Red Sea the 'sub-imperial' Egyptian-controlled Khedivial Mail company 
(1873, ex-Aziziyah Misriyah of 1870) prevented any Arab shipping ventures. Charles Issawi 
(The Economic History of Iran 1800-1914 [Chicago 1968] Ch. 4) makes no mention of any Persian 
ventures into steam shipping; reflecting the general pattern of semi-imperialist domination in 
Iran the Caspian sea trade was entirely controlled by Russian companies, while the Gulf and 
river trades were dominated by the British.
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obvious economic spin-offs such policies could also have a significant influence on 
the political posture of the countries involved 52 
     China, of course, was divided in three parts: the areas under total Western 
control such as Hong Kong; the semi-colonial treaty ports and cities such as 
Shanghai with its internationalised river system; and, finally, 'China proper' 
where Chinese authorities exercised full control. Coastal Chinese waters and, 
from 1862, the rivers had been the theatre of a lively competition between a 
number of British and American companies.53 In these relatively cramped 
conditions rivalry led to agreements which were forerunners of the worldwide 
conference system and, inevitably, were detrimental to Chinese requirements. 
Although individual Chinese merchants had previously invested in Western 
companies (which gave them privileged access but no control), in 1872 the 
energetic and visionary Li Hongzhang, Governor-General of Zhili and 
Commissioner for the Northern Ports, founded the first modern Chinese steam 
shipping company. Aiming at attracting mercantile capital through state 
sponsorship,54 the Chinese Merchants Steam Navigation Company (CMSNC) 
began operations with a small fleet including three new-buildings from Britain. 
Success came to the new company after Li appointed Dong Jing-sing, until then 
Jardine Matheson & Company's compradore, as manager 55 As Dick and Kentwell 
have expressed it succinctly, Dong "combined a very good knowledge of Western 
business practice and the technical side of ship management with excellent 
contacts in the business community"56 
    By 1876 the CMSNC was established enough to become a major player on 
the rivers and, from 1879, also the coast. Moreover, Dong bought the Shanghai 
Steam Navigation Company from the ailing American firm Russell & Company 
and for a time his situation looked to be very favourable.57 Some partners of 
Jardine, Matheson & Company were willing to sell their shipping interests to the
52 Cf. a Campo, KPM part 1 ('Macht'), and J. Forbes Munro's nascent biography of Mackinnon 
   and his BISN for similar arguments about state formation in the colonial context. 
53 Liu Kwang-ching Anglo-American Steamship Rivalry in China, 1862-1874 (Cambridge, Mass. 
  1962). 
54 I. C. Y. Hsu The Rise of Modern China (New York 1970) 340 and 344-346. 
55 On Dong see Liu Kwang-ching 'A Chinese Entrepreneur', in M. Keswick, ed. The Thistle and the 
  Jade (Hong Kong 1982) 108-117. 
'E' H. W. Dick & S. A. Kentwell Beancaker to Boxboat: Steamship Companies in Chinese Waters 
  (Canberra 1988) 178-9. 
57 Many Westerners in China actually believed that the purchase of the Shanghai SNC, with the 
   takeover of the Woosung railway, indicated a new phase in the policy of the Chinese 
   government aiming at the total expulsion of all Westerners and the nationalisation of their 
  property (S. Marriner & F. E. Hyde The Senior John Samuel Swire 1825-98: Management in Far 
  Eastern Shipping Trades [Liverpool 1%7166).
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CMSNC.-% But the CMSNC was heavily burdened by loans and debts and only a 
moratorium on payments made possible by Li allowed Dong, by 1882, to reach 
agreements with the strong British companies, Jardines and Swires. During the 
struggles of these years he also, coincidental with a number of Japanese projects,59 
experimented with sending ships outside East Asian waters. Although the latter 
ventures, made in years of financial difficulty, remained exceptional and made no 
inroads into the Western dominance of long-distance trade routes, they deserve to 
be recalled: several voyages during 1879-81 to Hawaii and San Francisco and one 
in 1881 to London. More permanent were the lines opened, from 1880, to 
Indochina and Southest Asia. 
    Although the CMSNC became a company of considerable size, it was 
started later and made less impact in terms of the transfer of technology than the 
naval effort on which China's self-strengtheners after the disastrous First Opium 
War had embarked. Their effort found its first culmination in Li Hongzhang's 
Jiangnan arsenal in Shanghai, which included an ironworks and in 1865 added 
shipbuilding to its activities.60 Until 1875 the plant had produced not only nine 
steamers, including the 3,000-ton Hai An, but also most of their boilers, pumps and 
engines. Chinese workers constructed ordnance and torpedoes at Tianjin. From 
our viewpoint perhaps most importantly, a full-scale dockyard was built at 
Fuzhou under a contract (1866) with the French engineer Giquel. The yard also 
included a naval academy with a design department concentrating on engine 
design. Local construction of steam engines commenced in 1869 and by the end of 
the contract, in 1874, fifteen ships, mainly of small tonnage, had been built. 
Interestingly, four of these were launched as passenger and freight carriers for the 
CMSNC.61 The outbreak of the Liuqiu [Ryukyu] crisis (from the Japanese 
perspective known as the Formosa Incident), however, saw them appropriated by 
naval authorities before they could enter commercial service. In sharp contrast to 
developments in Japan, the crisis had no direct positive effect on the development 
of the CMSNC or any rival shipping enterprise. No policy of subsidies was 
adopted; on the contrary, the company was later even required to contribute to the 
'naval fund' of 1889.62 The political base, from which modernisation was 
attempted in China, evidently remained fragile and incapable of formulating and 
sustaining a clear merchant shipping and shipbuilding policy. No doubt, however,
58 Keswick The Thistle and the jade 116. 
59 William D. Wray Mitsubishi and the N.Y.K., 1870-1914: Business Strategy in the Japanese Shipping 
  Industry (Cambridge, Mass. 1984) 264. 
60 John L. Rawlinson China's Struggle for Naval Development 1839-1895 (Cambridge, Mass. 1967) 
  41. 




could exist about the social base of China's maritime expansion: despite their 
obvious educational handicaps the Chinese possessed all the qualities and 
aptitudes required for success. 
    Nevertheless, although they were outdated with their wooden hulls and 
paddles, the Fuzhou ships gave China a technological base which could have 
given further impulses.63 But in the tumult of the times the self-strengtheners 
came up against strong conservative forces and, moreover, were divided between 
those who wanted to build their navy at home and aim for the long term and 
those who saw the need for the immediate importation of larger and more modern 
craft from overseas. While some small craft continued to be built at Fuzhou until 
the disastrous war with France,64 the latter policy prevailed (and, ultimately, 
failed against the power of the Japanese navy). In due course, as happened in 
several other countries 65 China might have used those imports as prototypes for 
indigenous naval construction programs and a massive navy-led transfer of 
technology from which merchant shipping would undoubtedly also have 
benefited. At the time, however, even if the flow of information from the West 
was not cut, the momentum of indigenous modern shipbuilding was fatally 
broken. Another outcome of this policy reversal was that the growth and 
development of the CMSNC could neither exert a stimulating influence on China's 
shipbuilding industry nor derive strength from it. The company had to continue 
to rely on importing vessels from Britain.66
     It is historical orthodoxy to contrast the failure of China to successfully 
adopt modern military and naval technology for defence against the predatory 
actions of the various imperialist powers with the rapid modernisation of Japan 
with her ideology of bummei kaika (civilisation and enlightenment).67 This 
ideology, in turn, is contrasted with the predominantly conservative outlook of 
China's leaders and, more or less tenuously, is linked to the Rangaku, the Dutch 
studies which were maintained during the period of exclusionin Japan. It is
63 It might be added, too, that the choice of French engineers was unfortunate, as British 
  shipbuilding and technology and marine engineering was clearly superior. 
64 For a brief overview of the Fuzhou dockyard and naval academy and their destruction, in 
   1884, by the French, see Bruce Swanson Eighth Voyage of the Dragon (Annapolis 1982) 76-80. 
65 See, e.g., Russia, Spain, and Japan itself. For a discussion of these issues see Clive Trebilcock    'British Armaments and European Industrialisation, 1890-1914', Economic History Review 2nd 
  ser., 26 (1973) 254-272. 
66 Dick & Kentwell, Beancaker to Boxboat 193-9. 
67 On the broad setting of Japan's modernisation see the thoughtful book by Jean-Pierre 
  Lehmann The Roots of Modern Japan (London 1988).
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arguable, however, to what extent China's fate was already sealed in 1880, even if 
the weaknesses in China's political and socio-economical structure and outlook 
were clearly visible. At the same time the basis of modern Japan had well and 
truly been laid. A significant number of overseas missions68 had demonstrated 
the utter determination of the reformers but, as the preceding passages have 
shown, China was making a great effort in both its maritime spheres. Yet the 
Formosa Incident had confirmed Japan's control over the Ryukyu Islands and, 
even if by 1880 China's naval program was getting under way, Japan was already 
ahead. As early as 1855 the Netherlands had donated a naval paddle steamer (the 
Kanko Maru) to Japan and in 1858 the first repair facility existed for such 
steamers 69 The modern Imperial Navy originated between 1868 and 1871 when it 
was brought into a separate ministry. The Yokosuka dockyard served as a fulcrum 
of technological modernisation and, although a policy of buying abroad was 
largely maintained, modern steam technology was rapidly being absorbed.7° A 
Naval Engineering School existed since 1876 and soon two more shipyards were 
opened at Nagasaki and HyOgo (Kobe). By 1883 the latter two had built over 
thirty steamers, several of which merchantmen that could also serve as auxiliary 
warships.71 
     Japan's maritime advances must also be seen against a general sense of the 
importance of the navy as a vital instrument for both self-defence and regional 
expansion. The Formosa Incident, in particular, had shown the crucial importance 
of a modern merchant fleet along Western lines. Although Japan's fleet at the time 
also contained square-riggers 72 government policy was focused on steamships. 
In 1880 there was 41,215 tons of sailing-ship tonnage on Japan's register but 
already at that early stage sail had been overtaken by steam. Steamer tonnage in
68 According to W. G. Beasley (The Rise of Modern Japan [London 1990] 85) between 1862 and 1867 
   no less than 68 missions left Japan for overseas and this movement continued unabated after 
   1870. Later missions included both large civilian complements, such as the Iwakura Mission, 
  and individual military-naval ones, like that of Heihachiro Togo. 
69 J. Stellingwerff Zijne Majesteits Raderstoomschip Soembing overgedragen aan Japan (Zutphen 1988); 
   H. Stapelkamp 'Hendrik Hardes (1815-1871): grondlegger moderne Japanse scheepsbouw en 
  industrie', Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis 11 (1992) 33. 
70 W. M. McGovern Modern Japan: Its Political, Military, and Industrial Organization (London 1920) 
   178-180. 
71 John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer & Albert M. Craig East Asia.:The Modern Transformation 
  (London 1%5) 246; [N.Y.K.] Golden Jubilee History of Nippon Yusen Kaisha 1885-1935 (Tokyo 
  1935) 9. 
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73 A. W. Kirkaldy British Shipping: Its History, Organisation and Importance (London 1919) 
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1877 totalled 79,202 tons, and eight years later 88,765 tons 74 As in the case of the 
CMSNC Japan's modern shipping sector was 'held up' in the difficult years 
around 1880, but its dynamism was amply illustrated by the symbiosis between 
government and business in the form of the financial support given after the 
Formosa Incident to the Mitsubishi company.75 This fertile business-government 
relationship was strongly reminiscent of the vital alliance between the government 
and long-distance steam shipping companies in Britain which has been signalled 
earlier and which was of such crucial importance in promoting British steam 
shipping, construction and technology ahead of their foreign rivals. After buying 
the Pacific Mail Steamship Company's Yokohama-Shanghai line and successfully 
fighting off the P & 0 on the same route, Mitsubishi with its incipient network of 
overseas services, in 1880, was poised for further expansion. But by contrast with 
the virtual monopoly position of the CMSNC in China, elsewhere in Japan 
entrepreneurial forces were building up which soon challenged Mitsubishi and 
the immodest advantages it gained under the subsidy system.76 After a dramatic 
shift in political power the Japanese government itself even supported the rise of 
Mitsui as a rival company, but from our viewpoint more important is that the 
shipping industry as a whole was highly dynamic 77 As such it constituted an 
extremely powerful element in the growth of Japan's overseas trade and the 
country's regional expansion which was confirmed in the formation (1885) of 
Nippon Yusen Kaisha. Elsewhere this concentration of forces on Tokyo had been 
anticipated by the foundation of the Osaka Sh8sen Kaisha. 
     Shipping was of vital importance to Japan. The country's configuration, 
rapid economic growth, political and strategic posture reinforced each other 
synergically in pressing for the adoption of modern steam tonnage. Geo-political 
armchair theorists were soon to make suggestive comparisons between Britain 
and Japan as 'windswept isles' off the opposite ends of Eurasia. In the absence of 
a fully-fledged metallurgical industry, however, for a considerable time the actual 
building of modern merchant vessels was not promoted as a matter of national
   against that figure stood no less than 1,233,785 tons of steamships. The figures for China for 
   1910 were: 14,314 tons sail and 88,888 tons steam shipping! 
74 Wray Mitsubishi 98 (Table 6) and 279 (Table 41). 
75 Ibid., Chs. 1-3. 
76 Ibid., Chs. 4-5; R. Miwa 'Maritime Policy in Japan: 1868-1937', in Yui & Nakagawa Business 
  History 126-130; The First Century of Mitsui 0. S. K. Lines, Ltd (Osaka 1985) Ch. 1, and especially 
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  and Economic Enterprise in Japan (Princeton 1965) 233-235. 
77 This is not the place to investigate the social and/or psychological origins of Japanese 
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   Samurai Income and Entrepreneurship (Cambridge, Mass. 1974) esp. 143-153and 'Conclusion'.
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priority. As late as 1894, only a couple of steamships of over 1,000 tons had been 
built in Japan itself. The only commercial repair yard of significance was that of 
Mitsubishi at Nagasaki; merchant steamers often had had to make use of one of 
the three naval establishments 78 It was only as late as 1896, in the wake of the 
war with China, that the Shipbuilding Encouragement Law was passed in order to 
create a local industry and the marine engineering industry to back it up 79
    The fact that Japan did not introduce its promotional legislation until 1896 
demonstrates how slowly steamship building and marine engineering had 
penetrated into the economic fabric of Asia. After a modest start even naval 
construction had been largely abandoned in China and Japan for direct imports 
from Western sources. Although it is true that sufficient engineers and skilled 
manpower were being trained to service and repair these imports without 
Western assistance, this constituted far from a full-scale transfer of technology. 
Indeed, taking a bird's eye view of the Asian littoral c. 1880, the picture is one of as 
yet very limited transfer. There were the naval dockyards of the independent 
powers as well as those maintained by Britain, France and the Netherlands in their 
colonies and then, in the commercial sphere, the maintenance establishments of 
the P & 0 and BISN in Calcutta and the several repair yards in other nodal points 
of the modern steamship network in ports such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia 
and Colombo. Technologically, these were Western implants rather than fulcrums 
of change in their Asian environment. 
     The total absence of a modern Asian shipbuilding industry was all the 
more striking in view of the large production, in the beginning of our period, of 
high-quality wooden sailing ships in a large number of Asian shipyards. 
Technological change as well as political interference on the part of metropolitan 
governments, however, had made the transition from wood to metal and from sail 
to steam a total impossibility and as all regional mail contracts were given to 
metropolitan steamship companies also these had not been able to provide 
stimulus for a local industry. To a certain extent, however, there may have been a 
clear choice on the part of Asian businessmen not to invest in metal shipbuilding. 
The spectacular rise of the Bombay textile industry in the 1860's and 1870's, for 
example, demonstrated the large funds available for industrial investment which 
at least partly could have been used for marine construction. It seems, however, 
highly unlikely that such a shipyard would have been profitable in the absence of
78 Golden jubilee 37. 
79 T. Nakamura Economic Growth in Prewar Japan (New Haven-London 1983) 60.
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strong local demand. Very much the same conclusion can be drawn about China, 
where the 1870's witnessed the first steam silk filatures 80 and Japan where higher 
priorities were assigned to the available public and private capital and local 
shipowners continued to rely on imports. As also Singapore demonstrated, it was 
not so-much any restraints imposed by shortages of entrepreneurial dynamism, 
skilled labour or other such input factors but rather the universality of the markets 
for both new and second-hand vessels which enabled Asian owners, not unlike 
many new and geographically marginal entrants in Europe (such as Finland, 
Norway or Greece) to meet their requirements. Thus they had no incentive to 
press for the development of a local shipbuilding industry. 
     In comparison, Asian Western-style merchant shipping fared considerably 
better than shipbuilding, although its overall record was modest and patchy. 
Asian shipowners, particularly in India and Southeast Asia but later also Japan, 
bought both Asian and second-hand Western sailing ships in large numbers. 
Although de facto excluded from the intercontinental trades with Europe and the 
United States they found ample employment in the Asian seas, sometimes 
supplementing, sometimes competing with European-owned tonnage. Arabs, 
Indians, and overseas Chinese became major participants, but only the latter two 
groups made the transition to steam. Commonly small operators, they were from 
the early 1870's joined by the much larger 'home' Chinese and Japanese 
companies, above all the CMSNC and Mitsubishi. With strong government 
support these companies had the potential to become real players in their regions 
and perhaps beyond; from the vantage point of 1880, however, it was not at all 
clear what the next fifteen years or so might bring. Yet the position of the CMSNC 
and Mitsubishi was potentially much stronger than that of Asian owners in the 
British and Dutch colonies. Essentially, it is difficult to see in what directions such 
smaller owners could have expanded without provoking reactions from 
established Western companies. It is unlikely that lack of investment funds 
constituted a strong negative factor. Although the Westerners could command far 
more financial power, in specific sectors and for specific purposes Asian owners, 
with or without government subventions, were able to find enough support 
through family, business and other connections. But, ultimately, business and 
government leaders often had other concerns and priorities than merchant 
shipping.
80 Robert Y. Eng 'Chinese Entrepreneurs, the Government and the Foreign Sector: The Canton 
  and Shanghai Silk-Reeling Enterprises, 1861-1932', Modern Asian Studies 18 (1984) 353-356.
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    What, finally does all of this mean for our theme of the transfer of 
technology and science in maritime transport?81 By 1880 in China and Japan 
steamers were being built which, in comparison with Western shipbuilding and 
marine engineering standards, could only be seen as modest steps on the path 
towards complete transfer. The training of engineers had been taken up in the 
navies of both countries and an active flow of information from Europe 
complemented the significant number of professional missions and overseas 
training courses. But at the same time the adoption of 'buy abroad' policies 
without commitment to using those foreign-built vessels as models for a home 
construction program delayed effective full-scale transfers such as Japan was to 
achieve after the turn of the century. Very much the same conclusion applies to 
China's naval and commercial sector and Japan's merchant shipbuilding and 
engineering. At this stage of developments it is not surprising that academic 
studies in these subjects also were not yet part of any university curriculum. As 
yet no home-grown scientific base existed for this industry. In short, China and 
Japan had made partial transfers, the latter more so than the former. 
    By contrast to politically independent China and Japan, the situation 
elsewhere was far from advanced. The string of naval and commercial repair 
shops in colonial dependencies was fully controlled by Westerners. Local 
inhabitants provided the labour and perhaps part of the clerical staff. Western 
technology was handled by these yards but this cannot meaningfully be identified 
as an effective form of technology transfer. Despite their large size they had 
virtually no impact on the modernisation of their hinterland or the technological 
education of their indigenous work forces. There were no training courses for 
indigenous aspirants nor educational voyages to Europe.82 No technical works or 
any other specialist publications were imported other than for the European 
management. The yards formed part of the Western sector of these largely dualist 
economies. While shipping to a certain extent stood open to Asian participation, 
no such breakthrough had been made in ship construction and repair. The 
technology of transfer is an extremely complex process involving many other and 
complex issues, but in the maritime industries the comparison of the achievements 
of China and Japan with the fortunes of the Dutch and British colonies shows that 
evidently no effective transfer and no access to the sources of Western technology 
could be achieved, or even initiated, without political power.
81 There is a vast literature on the transfer of technology in general, but regrettably shipping and 
   shipbuilding are virtually completely neglected in these texts. See, e.g., D. J. Jeremy, 
   International Technology Transfer: Europe, Japan, and t he U.S.A.,1700-1914 (Aldershot 1991); 
   I. Inkster Science and Technology in History (London 1991) esp. 20-25. 
82 The only exception in this context was the practice of the (largely Indian-owned) Bombay SNC 
   to employ local engineers on its fleet.
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